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Iran: Dependency and Industrialisation
Hassan Hakimian
If the free-traders cannot understand how one
nation can grow rich at the expense of another, we
need not wonder, since these same gentlemen also
refuse to understand how within one country one
class can enrich itself at the expense of another.
IMarx, On the Question of Free Trade, 18481
Introduction
The discussion of the potential for capitalist
industrialisation in the ldcs remains a hotly-debated
issue. The question has appeared in various forms:
'can independent capitalist industrialisation take place
in Iran?'; 'is the capitalist path to industrialisation in
Kenya viable?'; or 'is imperialist penetration enhancing
or retarding capitalist industrialisation in Brazil?', for
example. Despite the variations in form, the essential
concern so far has been to investigate the theoretical
possibilities, in these countries, of revolutionising the
productive forces by the pursuit of a capitalist path as
exemplified by the experience of the advanced capitalist
countries (accs).
Contemporary answers to this question have ranged
from an outright 'no' by Frank to an outright 'yes' by
Warren. In between would lie a variety of responses
ranging from a 'yes' conditional on certain 'national
measures' which need to be taken in order to overcome
the obstacles generally imposed from the 'outside'
(Sunkel and Furtado for instance), to a modified 'yes'
from Cardoso, who recognised that capitalist
industrialisation can and does take place but with
certain fundamental characteristics which should not
be overlooked (dependent capitalist development).
For our purposes in this short article, we will consider
only three such views in relation to the Iranian
experience: Frank and Cardoso within the dependency
perspective, and Bill Warren whose views are
diametrically opposed to those of dependency writers
as a whole. We will assume that our readers are
familiar with these writers' works, and we hope that
our discussion of Iran will enable us to shed further
light on the relative tenability of these views.
The Iranian Experience:
Recent Industrial Record
Iran has become increasingly integrated into the
expanding international economy in the post-war period.
These years have also seen some substantial structural
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change in the economy, with a notable growth in the
manufacturing sector. In this respect, Iran is to be
grouped with certain ldcssuch as Brazil, Mexico,
South Koreawhich have experienced growth in
their manufacturing sectors. There exist, however,
interesting specificities in the case of Iran.
First, Iran's growing integration, largely through
expanding exports of petroleum, has provided the
country with a large and increasing amount of revenue,
relieving the foreign exchange constraint. This is
significant in that the recent history of most Idcs
operating under the importsubstitution model of
industjialisation has frequently been marked by chronic
crisis in their balance of payments and a concomitant
cumulative debt problem. This has obviously been
largely absent in Iran, particularly in the last decade.
Secondly, in contrast to countries whose exporting
enterprises are mainly run by private interests (foreign
or domestic), in the case of Iran, given the state
ownership of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC),
the revenues have accrued directly to the state. This
has given the stateas the sole possessor of such
fundsa unique position from which to control and
dictate the direction of economic change and the
actors participating in the process.
Thirdly, Iran has differed from other oil-exporting
countries (excepting probably Venezuela and Algeria)
in that its industrialisation is not merely a direct
outcome of the oil price boom; its origins go back as
far as the state policies of the 1930s and it is therefore
at a more advanced stage now.
No less important are the social and political aspects
of the Iranian experience, a forceful indication of
which is to be found in the social indignation historically
expressed in the massive uprising in February 1979.
This mass-based social upheaval exposed as hollow
visions 'the march towards the Great Civilisation'
promoted by the deposed Shah's propaganda machinery
and the widely-held view, encouraged by his strongest
allies in the West, of Iran as an island of stability and its
development path as an economic miracle.
Events since February 1979 have also cast serious
doubt yet again on the conventional wisdom which
envisages underdevelopment as arising from a 'shortage
of capital'. Iran's unhappy experience with development
from above or rather industrialisation at gunpoint-
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notwithstanding the enormous capital and resources
available for investment - exemplifies once and for
all, we hope, such partial and inadequate understanding
of development.
As mentioned earlier, the Iranian economy has
experienced considerable transformations since the
late 1950s. The overall pattern of the distribution of
GDP indicates a steady diminution in the share of
agriculture, from around one third of domestic output
in 1959 to about one tenth by 1977. With the services
sector maintaining a share of between 30 and 40 per
cent, the oil sector had doubled its corresponding
share to 32 per cent in the same period. The
manufacturing sector also increased its share, from 10
to 16 per cent of GDP; indeed during the Third Plan
period of 1962-67, manufacturing value added grew at
nearly 13 percent pa in real terms and then approached
14 per cent during the Fourth Plan (1968-72). It has
also attracted a consistently increasing fraction of the
workforce; the 2.Smn people working in manufacturing
in 1977 represented a quarter of gs need to be made in
this respect.
First, Iranian statistics of this period are notoriously
unreliable. Secondly, even if accurate, none of the
above indices can be taken as unconditional measures
of development or industrialisation. As Emmanuel
¡1974:63! has interestingly shown, in terms of comparative
shares of industry in both total product and labour
force, Argentina would be roughly as developed or
"industrialised" as the US, and indeed, Hong Kong
would be even more "industrialised" than the US'!
Finally, the unqualified use of aggregate data often
helps to conceal either the low bases from which
impressive growth rates emerge, or says little about
the nature and size of the plants or the composition.
For such reasons we need to look more closely at
Iran's industrial performance and to characterise it as
follows:
despite rapid growth of large industrial establishments,
small scale labour-intensive workshops still by far
predominate. In the period 1967-77, these accounted
for as much as 97 per cent of the total number of
establishments and more than 80 per cent of industrial
employment. While the average employment size of
each unit (small and large) in the urban areas was
between four and five persons, the corresponding
figure for the large units varied between 50 and 60
employees. The average employment in small units
alone would be less than fourprobably two to
three persons isee Hakimian 1972:85 I. A remarkable
feature, however, is the growth of the small
establishments alongside the large ones: employment
in the former grew at about 6 per cent pa compared
with 8 per cent pa growth for the latter in the same
period;
despite the state's initiative, particularly since the
Fourth Plan, to set up a capital goods industry
which has resulted in some growth in this sector, it
still remains fairly small and dominated by the
production of transport equipment. Furthermore,
in Iranian statistics, this sector also includes consumer
durable goods. Hence commodities such as auto-
mobiles, radio and television sets, refrigerators and
telephone sets are also counted as capital goods!
Machine tools production or production of the
means of production proper, however, remains low
and, as we shall see, Iran imports much of her
required capital goods;
the nature of most modern plants' requires some
attention. As a matter of fact, many of these are
mere assembly plants in the form of joint ventures
with the participation of foreign capital arising to a
large extent from state protection offered to domestic
production under the import-substitution model.
This assembly nature of the operation is reflected in
the low value added in the domestic industry: no
more than one third of the total value of products
produced by industrial' firms in the whole of the
country was accounted for by the domestic industrial
value added! It seems fair, in the light of the generally
weak linkage of domestic industry with other sectors,
to assume that the overall domestic value added (ie
including other sectors also) for industrial products
would be very limited as well, implying large import
requirements;
the composition of Iranian imports, indeed, illustrates
this. In the period 1971 to 1977 a predominant share
of Iranian imports was accounted for by intermediate
and capital goods (about 74 per cent of the total on
average). More specifically, 60 per cent of total
Iranian imports in the 1970s went to industries (and
mining) in the form of intermediate and capital
goods. This shows the extent to which Iranian
industry relies on international sources of basic
materials and components of final production as
well as technology;
Iran's capacity to export manufactured goods has
been almost negligible. Of a relatively low and even
decreasing volume of non-oil exports (equivalent to
only about 4.6 per cent of the import bill in 1977!) as
little as 24 per cent on average consisted of new
industrial' goods in the period 1971 to 1977. And
even then these are made up of such light consumer
and intermediate goods as detergents and soap,
glycerine and chemicals, shoes and textiles. This is a
major respect in which Iran's industrialisation differs
from that of countries such as Hong Kong, India
and Taiwan, which account for the bulk of Third
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World manufactured exports. Moreover Iran's heavy
reliance on revenues from the export of such an
exhaustible resource as oil will make the capacity to
export manufactures more of an issue in the longer
term.
This characterisation of Iran's industrialisation process
takes us back to our central question: has Iran in fact
been on the path of self-generating industrialisation?
Has her industrialisation been in the nature of a
development of underdevelopment, deriving from her
incorporation into the global system, as Frank envisages,
or has it rather been directly caused and favoured by
imperialist penetration as Warren would have it.
To begin with Frank, whatever one's reservations
about the meaning and reliability of the data reviewed
above may be, it would be very difficult to contend
that the outcome of recent developments in Iran has
been more or greater 'underdevelopment', or that
there has occurred a process of 'accumulated back-
wardness'. Indeed, the evidence of high economic
growth and industrialisation, even though modified in
certain important respects above, in essence entailed
a process of qualitative transformation including rapid
urbanisation, demographic change and the differentiation
and creation of new social structures and strata. But
the contradictory nature of the process must not be
overlooked either: this has necessarily entailed a widening
gap between the haves and the have-nots and hence
brought about an increasing concentration of material
wealth and social privilege into certain areas and into
the hands of certain groups. These social costsboth
material and humanhave been an integral part of
the contradictory process, but they should by no
means lead one to deny the reality of the transformation.
If anything, 'the existence of contradictions does not
indicate an obstacle to capitalist development, but
rather a condition of that development' I Cardosoj.
Indeed, it is Frank's confusion between the necessarily
contradictory nature of capitalist industrialisation and
his (unfavourable) ethical evaluation of itthat leads
him to diagnose the malaise as 'accumulated back-
wardness'; hence his unwarranted conclusion about
permanent stagnation and a universal lack of 'internal'
dynamisman analysis which collapses so miserably
in the case of Iran. But this is not at all to suggest that
we agree with Warren's version of full-blown indus-
trialisation either. Warren's bold proclamations about
the future of industrialisation in Third World countries
are essentially based on three premises: the break-up
of colonial monopol' powers and growing East-West
rivalry; increasing popular pressure within Ides; and
finally the changed favourable attitudes of the aces.
We have explained elsewhere why we regard these
premises as highly questionable in relation to his
overall conclusion that the Ides will continue to
industrialise and that any obstacles are 'internal' to
their economies IHakimian 1979:30-371. Warren's
empirical observations (even if accepted) remain
unaccounted for, and his generalisations about the
future are largely baseless projections.
In particular, to regard the Iranian process of
industrialisation as being partly fuelled by domestic
popular pressures is simply fictitious. If anything, the
emergence of the new post-war 'order' in Iran was
actually preceded by a ruthless quelling of political
forces in the country; and in the aftermath of the 1953
CIA-engineered coup, a repressive apparatus held
sway whose upkeep was very much dependent on US
imperialist support until the last moments of its downfall
isee McMichael et aI 1974 j.
So far we have argued against an underestimation of
the dynamics of the fast growing Iranian economy-
inherent in the stagnationist versions of the dependency
approach; but we have also argued against a Warrenite
overestimation of the dynamism and the nature of
changes that are underway. This leaves us, therefore,
with a position which recognises the dynamics of the
transformation but also remains cautious in interpreting
the process and attaching significance to its implications.
We saw that, in contradistinction to both Frank and
Warren, Cardoso allowsfor industrialisation as we/las
dependency, or 'the development of dependent
capitalism' I Cardoso 19721. This view, highlighted in
Cardoso's attempt to characterise Brazil's model as
'associateddependent development' (1973b), also
seems to shed light on Iran's experience: a dynamic
and transforming structure accompanied by new ties
and dependent relations with the international economy
which in turn impart further new characteristics to it.
The similarity is shown in the fact that, as in the case of
Brazil, Iran's experience is also 'characterised by a
simultaneous and differentiated expansion of the three
sectors of the economy: the national, the foreign and
the public' j Cardoso 1976:251. Indeed to understand
fully the dynamics of the transformation and the laws
governing it one would need to examine these three
actors and their interaction closely. Given the complexity
and importance of the subject such a task remains
beyond our limited means in this article.
The Iranian Experience:
the Significance of the Oil Industry
We turn now to another distinct aspect of Iranian
development and industrialisation, the crucial
importance of the oil sectorhistorically the main
channel for imperialist penetration and the prime
force behind Iran's integration into the international
economy. Indeed, an overall evaluation of Iranian
industrialisation possibilities would be incomplete without
an examination of the oil industry. There are two
reasons for this.
First, the history of the evolution of the industry shows
a vivid and longlasting interaction of internal and
external forces [see Hakimian 1979:63-69, for further
discussion I. At the political level, it is now well-known
that the CIA coup of 1953which was carried out
'after a suggestion from Winston Churchill to the
Eisenhower administration' I The Guardian, 30 March
19791was a direct response by the imperialist forces
to contain the rise of nationalism in Iran manifested in
Dr Mossadeq's attempt to nationalise the oil industry.
On the other hand, the subsequent creation of an oil
consortium composed of the 'Seven Sisters' and the
resumption of negotiations in 1954 provided an occasion
for the member companies to reach a clandestine
understandingthe so-called 'Participants Agreement'-
which paved the way for a direct (although discreet)
method of restricting production for the purposes of
avoiding an oil glut. This was achieved by the formula
of the 'Aggregate Programmed Quantity'. or APQ,
which 'was really to become the arbiter of Iran's future
growth', the significance of the new system lying in the
fact that 'it effectively held down production in Iran to
the levels required by the least demanding of the
companies' [Sampson 1975:145-61. Hence, with the
strategic decisions over the price and output of oil
subject to the vagaries of a handful of powerful
transnational corporations, the Iranian oil industry
belied any suggestion that it remained a national one.
Secondly, with the recent OPEC breakthrough in
raising the price of oil, one wonders to what extent the
resulting colossal oil revenues may be regarded as a
real indication of the potential for the future trans-
formation of the productive forces. These events are
indeed highly significant for the future of centre-
periphery relations. The Iranian experience, in particular,
which has culminated in a breakaway from direct
dependence on transnational oil companies, certainly
provides a serious challenge to the cruder versions of
dependency.
But the impact of this massive transfer of financial and
monetary resources to the OPEC countries must not
be overestimated either, for the following reasons.
First, the 'real' price of oil (ie deflated by the price of
world manufactures) actually fell in the period 1976-
78. Secondly, we must consider the actual utilisation
of the oil revenues. In the period 1974-78, just under
one third of the total OPEC revenue was surplus (ie
not absorbable in OPEC countries) and, of that, as
much as 43 per cent ($75.7 billion) flowed back into
short and long term private and official investments in
just two countries, the US and the UK! Even the
absorbed portion has consisted largely of purchases of
armaments and luxury goods with little impact on the
advancement of productive forces. This is remarkably
clear in the case of Iran with a high absorption
capacity: the US military sales to Iran amounted to
$18,829 millions in the period 1950-77, of which as
much as 92 per cent came in 1972-77. In 1977 alone it
reached over $5 millions, constituting about 40 per
cent of the total value of the imports bill. The militarising
trend was further reflected in the growing size of
'defence' expenditure which assumed a size of between
24 and 29 per cent of total budget expenditure during
1974-76 IGraham 1978:1761. The era, however, came
to an abrupt end in February 1979 when the expensively
equipped Imperial Army crumbled before millions of
bare but clenched fists.
Concluding Remarks
In this article we have argued against two extreme
views on the possibility of peripheral industrialisation:
Frank's rejectionist view on the one hand, and Warren's
conception of full prospects for industrialisation of
Third World countries on the other. In the case of
Iran, we saw that a Frankian view would lead to an
underestimation of the structural change and industrial
transformation which have occurred since the 1950s
while a Warrenite view would lead to an overestimation
of these. We argued for an alternative view: 'the
development of Iran's dependence'! Hence in examining
the processes of economic transformation and industrial
growth, we tried to show that strong ties of dependence
have linked the Iranian industrial structure to the
international system. Looking through Cardoso's
spectacles, in the case of Iran we found a dynamic and
transforming structure with new ties and relations to
the international economy which in turn imparted
new conditioning characteristics to it. This was vindicated
by our examination, however brief, of the developments
in the oil industry.
It seems to us that the two types of approach which
confine themselves either to pointing out the impossibility
of capitalist industrialisation or to marvelling at its
potential in Third World countries both miss out the
necessarily contradictory natüre of 'creative destruction'
which this process has. It is clear that arguments for
socialist transformation of the dependent/dominated
societies require a clear understanding of what capitalism
is capable of achieving in the periphery as well as what
it is not. This remains essential to the formulation of
any radical alternative which aims to bring about a
better life for the masses of working people in these
countries.
note: the more general dependency references are not given
here but in the bibliography at the end of this Bulletin.
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